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UNITED STATES v. RAMIREZ-SOBERANES: 1
IS SYMPATHY TOWARDS MINORITIES A
RACE-NEUTRAL REASON UNDER BATSON v.
KENTUCKy2 ?
Thomas Galan3
I. INTRODUCTION

In September of 1997, during a cocaine investigation of a
Utah condominium, Luis Alberto Ramirez-Soberanes was
arrested for illegal firearm possession. 4 During the warranted
search of the condominium, law enforcement officials uncovered
a .45 caliber semi-automatic handgun, a loaded magazine, and a
box of .45 caliber ammunition in a closet of the condominium. 5
Subsequent to his conviction of the firearms charge, RamirezSoberanes appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit raising, inter alia, that a constitutional violation of
his rights under Batson v. Kentucky 6 occurred through the use of
one of the Government's peremptory challenges. 7 Ms. Hannah
Brown was challenged by the Government by reason of her being
an employee of a McDonald's in a neighborhood that was
predominately populated by minorities . The Government
explained the peremptory challenge by stating that "[t]here may
be some sympathies" towards minorities and "to eliminate any
sense of prejudice . . .we felt that it was appropriate to strike
her." 9 Although the defendant claimed the peremptory challenge
was a race-based decision, the district court ruled in favor of the

210 F.3d 391 (10th Cir. 2000), No. 99-4097, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
6666, at *3, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 887 (2000).
2 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
3J.D., Jacob D. Fuchsberg, Touro Law Center, 2002. This Note was the
Touro Law Review's competition winner in the Spring 2000 competition.
4 Ramirez-Soberanes, No. 99-4097, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6666, at *3.
5Id. at *3.
6476

U.S. 79.

7Ramirez-Soberanes, No. 99-4097, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6666, at *2.
8 Id. at *4.
9 Id.
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Government and found the decision to be race-neutral, ultimately
excusing Ms. Brown from the jury.' 0
The issue of race discrimination as part of the decision
making process when selecting a jury was tackled in Batson v.
Kentucky," in which the United States Supreme Court mapped
out a three-prong test in order to assist in the elimination of racebased peremptory challenges.12 The first step of the Batson test
requires the defendant to make out a prima facie case of
discrimination. 13 Next, the burden shifts to the Government
which must then put forth an adequate, race-neutral explanation
for the peremptory challenge. 14 "In determining whether the
Government has satisfied the requirements of Batson's second
step, we must keep firmly in mind that Batson's holding rests
squarely on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 15 The third prong delegates to the trial court the
duty of determining whether the defendant established purposeful
discrimination. 16
Since its inception in 1986, the Batson test has evolved
into a tool employed to combat discrimination. The second step
of the test, which deals with the Government's race-neutral
explanation, is often the focal point of discussion and even more
so the element that most cases turn on. 17 This Note will discuss
the effects that the Batson test and its progeny have had on the
peremptory challenge, with a strong focus on the second prong of
the three-prong test. Furthermore, this Note will examine the
term "race-neutral" as defined by the various decisions of the
courts and analyze "race-neutral" in relation to the explanation of
'0 Id. at *5.
" 476 U.S. 79.
12 id.
3 d. at 93.
14 Id. at 94.
"5U.S. v. Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d 388, 393 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 1091 (1994).
16 Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
17 See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
See also Purkett v.
Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995); U.S. v. Sneed, 34 F.3d 1570 (10th Cir. 1994);
U.S. v. Johnson, 4 F.3d 904 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1123
(1994).
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"sympathies" for minorities which was
explanation in the Ramirez-Soberanes case.

the prosecutor's

II. HISTORY
A. THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE

"A Peremptory Challenge is a challenge to a prospective
juror for which no reason need be given or cause assigned." 1 8
The peremptory challenge can be dated back as far as two
thousand years in the usage of Roman Law in 104 BC. 19 England
also made use of the peremptory challenge in its early days of
trials where the prosecutor in felony cases had unlimited
challenges and the defendants were permitted to execute thirtyfive strikes .20 The history of the peremptory challenge in
American jurisprudence dates back to the early common law of
the United States. 2 1 The English tradition of the peremptory
challenge was brought to the United States, and "[iun 1790 the
new United States Congress granted thirty-five peremptories to
defendants in treason trials and twenty to defendants in trials for
capital felonies specified in the Act of 1790. ",22 From 1870 to
present time, nearly all states have provided both the prosecution
and the defendant a certain number of peremptory challenges. 23
The peremptory challenge has been used to narrow the
venire list with the goal of procuring an ideal jury with optimum
qualifications and to build a jury that can make decisions based on
the evidence rather than on personal bias.2 4 The attorney and the
18 47 AM. JUR. 2d Jury § 234 (1995).

19Eric N. Einhorn, Batson v. Kentucky and J.E.B. v. Alabama Ex Rel.
T.B.: Is the Peremptory Challenge Still Preeminent?, 36 B.C. L. REv. 161,
166 (1994).
20 id.
(summarizing the
21 See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-17 (1965)
development of the peremptory challenge from its early stages at common law
through it's usage in the 20th Century).
22 Einhorn, supra note 19, at 167.
23 Einhorn, supra note 19, at 167.
24

Swain, 380 U.S. at 219.
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client are given a set amount of opportunities during the voir dire
to strike any prospective juror because of a personal characteristic
that may lead to a bias. The list of commonly accepted raceneutral reasons is long and encompasses reasons ranging from
juror demeanor and attentiveness to the juror's familiarity with
the subject matter of the case. 5 Any reason, "ranging from the
juror's occupation to the look in his eye," 26 may be acceptable.
Although the peremptory challenge may be invoked without
cause, and "need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a
challenge for cause, 27 litigants are restricted from challenging a
juror on racial grounds. 28 The issue of race-based peremptory
challenges has sparked much debate in the legal community. It
has been challenged in the courts in a number of legal decisions
which limit the peremptory challenge without completely
29
eliminating its usage.
B. THE EFFECT OF BATSON V. KENTUCKY ON THE PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGE

The United States Supreme Court made a first attempt to
address the problematic issues of the peremptory challenge in
Swain v. Alabama.30 After Robert Swain, an African-American,
was convicted of rape in the circuit court of Talladega County,
Alabama, he made motions to strike the trial jury and to void the
petit jury on the basis of racially discriminatory peremptory
challenges. 3 1 Swain argued that the peremptory challenges
violated his Equal Protection Rights under the Federal
Constitution because eight black jurors were eliminated from the
jury venire, six of whom were struck through peremptory
25

Michelle Mahony, The Future Viability of Batson v. Kentucky and the

PracticalImplications of Purkett v. Elem, 16 REv. LrIG. 137, 154-55 (1997).
26 Jayson Hochberg, Peremptory Challenge: An American Relic, 10 WTR.
CRIM. JUST. 10 (1996).

Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
47 AM. JUR. 2d Jury § 244 (1995).
29 Mahony, supra note 25, at 140-41.
30 380 U.S. 202.
3 Id. at 203.

27
28
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challenges. 32 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed
the conviction and the United States Supreme Court subsequently
granted certiorari.
The United States Supreme Court's holding in Swain
defined a new burden that was placed on the defendant in proving
a case of discrimination in jury selection. The Court held that
"the defendant must, to pose the issue, show the prosecutor's
systematic use of peremptory challenges against Negroes over a
period of time." 34 This burden remained in effect for the next
twenty-one years, until the United States Supreme Court
overruled the burden in the landmark case of Batson v.
Kentucky.35
In Batson v. Kentucky, a black man was tried in Jefferson
circuit court, Kentucky on charges of second degree burglary and
receipt of stolen goods.36 The jury was made up of all whites due
to the prosecution's challenges of the only four black men on the
venire. 3 Defense counsel moved to discharge the entire jury
based on a violation of the defendant's rights under the Sixth and
38
The motions were denied and the
Fourteenth Amendments.
to appeal to the Supreme Court of
only
was
convicted,
defendant
Kentucky, which affirmed the trial court's holding. 39 The United
States Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari and
ultimately reversed the lower court's ruling .4
Id. at 205.
33 Id. at 203.
34 Id. at 227 (emphasis added).
35
Batson, 416 U.S. at 92.
36 Id. at 82.
37 Id. at 83.
32

Id; See U.S. CONST. amend. VI, XIV. The Sixth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
38

wherein the crime shall have been committed . .

."

The Fourteenth

Amendment provides in pertinent part: "No State shall make or enforce any

law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States . . .; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection

of the laws."
39 Batson, 476 U.S. at 83-84.
40 Id. at 84.
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In combating the heavy burden set out in the Swain
decision, the Supreme Court established a three-prong test
previously mentioned in evaluating a claim of racial
discrimination in peremptory challenges .41 The first of the three
prongs requires the defendant to make out a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination. 42 To establish such a case, the
defendant must first show that he is a member of a cognizable
racial group and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory
challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's
race. 43 Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact that
peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that
permits "those to discriminate who are of a mind to
discriminate. " 44 Finally, the defendant must show that these facts
and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the
prosecutor used the peremptory challenge to exclude the
prospective juror from the petit jury on account of their race.
The second prong of the three-part process shifts the
burden to the prosecution to give a race-neutral explanation for
the peremptory challenge. 46
Although the prosecution's
explanation need not rise to the level of a challenge for cause, the
government may not simply rebut the prima facie case by stating
the challenge was made "on the assumption - or his intuitive
judgment - that [the juror] would be partial to the defendant
because of their shared race." 47 Furthermore, the
explanation
48
must be "related to the particular case to be tried."
The process of shifting the burden was borrowed from
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 49 and is concerned with
disparate treatment rather than disparate impact in deciding
41Id.
42

at 94-98.

Id. at 94.

43

Id. at 96.
44 Batson, 476 U.S. at 83-84 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562

(1953)).
41 Id. at 96.
46
Id. at 97.

Id. at 97.
41 Id. at 98.
41 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000(h) (1994).
47
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whether a peremptory challenge is race-neutral. 50 This prong has
a strong grounding in the Equal Protection Clause, which
guarantees citizens freedom from racial discrimination by the
government. 5' Furthermore, the Equal Protection Clause would
be made "vain and illusory" if the courts permitted the
prosecutor's assumption that the mere race of a person comes
make a decision on
along with biases that would cause a juror to
52
evidence.
the
than
rather
prejudice
personal
After the reason for the peremptory challenge is given by
the prosecutor, "the burden shifts back to the defendant to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the State purposefully
discriminated against the struck jurors on the basis of their race in
exercising its peremptory challenges." 53 This final prong of the
three-prong Batson test is left up to the discretion of the trial
court to "determine whether the defendant has established
purposeful discrimination." 54 By reason of the final prong
having little evidence to establish itself, "the best evidence often
will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the
55
challenge."
The next step in this procedure is for the trial court to
determine whether the explanation for the challenge is
purposefully discriminatory. 56 "Discriminatory purpose
implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of
decision
the
that
implies
It
consequences.
maker ... selected ... a particular course of action at least in
'in spite of,' its adverse effects
part 'because of,' not merely
57
group."
upon an identifiable
50

Batson, 476 U.S. at 94, n. 18 (disparate treatment under Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act requires intent or purpose to discriminate, as distinguished
from disparate impact, which is the impact of discrimination on a certain group
as a result of non-racial decisions that are made).
51 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
52Id. at 98.

5 Mahoney, supra note 25, at 155.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
51 Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365.
14

56 Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.

"7 Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360 (quoting Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
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Five years after the Batson decision, the Supreme Court
58
revisited the issue of peremptory challenge in Powers v. Ohio.
In Powers, a white man objected to the striking of seven black
jurors. 59 The trial court overruled each of the objections made by
the defendant and he was subsequently convicted of murder.6 °
The Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the Equal
Protection Clause extended to a peremptory challenge when the
61
defendant and the prospective juror were of different races.
The Powers decision in essence expanded Batson's holding,
eliminating the requirement that the defendant and the prospective
juror must be of the same race. 62 The Supreme Court stated,
"[t]o bar petitioner's claim because his race differs from that of
the excluded jurors would be to condone the arbitrary exclusion
63
of citizens from the duty, honor, and privilege of jury service."
Other decisions have helped mold the Batson decision into
what it is today. In the 1991 case of Edmonson v. Leesville,64 the
Supreme Court extended the Batson three prong test to civil
cases. 65 Additionally, in 1992 the Court decided Georgia v.
McCollum, 66 where it held that the Batson claim could be made
by the prosecution against a defendant's peremptory challenge.67
One of the most significant expansions of the Batson test was
made in Hernandez v. New York. 68 In Hernandez, the Court held
that "[o]nce a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation
for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the
" 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
59 Id. at 402-03.
60 Id. at 403.
61
1d. at 404.
62 Id. at 413-15.
63 Id.

at 415.

500 U.S. 614 (1991).
Id. at 631 (recognizing that the harms that are to be protected by the three
prong test are not limited to the criminal sphere, the Court held that the
protections offered by Batson are extended to civil cases).
505 U.S. 42 (1992).
67 Id. at 59 (holding "the Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from
engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of
peremptory challenges.")
6
65

68 500 U.S. 352.
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ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary
issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing
becomes moot."

69

This change essentially eliminates the need for

the first prong of the Batson test if the prosecutor offers any
explanation for the challenge .70 The most recent case that further
develops the Batson ruling is the 1995 case of Purkett v. Elem,71
in which the Supreme Court focuses mainly on the second prong
of the Batson test.72 It is the metamorphosis of the Batson
decision with respect to the most recent case of Purkett v. Elem
that leads to the discussion and analysis of United States v.
Ramirez-Soberanes.
III. UNITED STATES V. RAMIREZ-SOBERANES:

RACE NEUTRAL?

A. THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE IN RAMIREZ-SOBERANES
It was the challenge against the African-American juror,
Ms. Hannah Brown, that sparked the Batson claim in RamirezSoberanes.73 It is important to identify the explanation given by
the Government in analyzing a Batson claim to discern whether a
race-neutral reason has been given. In the judge's chambers the
prosecuting attorney gave the following reasons for the strike:
MR. VINCENT7 : The reason is her place of

employment; has nothing to do with her ethnic

background.
THE COURT:
Where does she work?
MR. VINCENT: She works at McDonald's.
THE COURT: The reason - she works at
McDonald's and you find that significant is what?
MR. VINCENT: Nothing more than they have a
69

Id. at 359.

id.
7'514 U.S. 765.
72 Id. at 768-70.
7'Ramirez-Soberanes, No. 99-4097,
7 Id. at *4 (testimony of prosecutor
70

2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6666, at *4.
Mark Vincent, justifying his removal of

juror Ms. Brown).
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tendency in fast-food restaurants to deal with-in lot
of areas minority groups, legals, illegals. There
may be some sympathies that are there one way or
the other. And just to eliminate any sense of
prejudice one way or the75other, we felt that it was
appropriate to strike her.
The prosecuting attorney, Mr. Vincent, went further to state:
Well, I'm not prejudiced against her for being
black ...

If she was white, if she was Hispanic, if

she was any other ethnicity, it is my experience
that people who work at McDonald's have a lot of
dealings with a large group of people, including
aliens. And I don't know if there's any sympathies
one way or the other, but because there is a
propensity for her to have dealings with a large
group of people, that may or may not have
prejudiced her. I don't know. I just feel that it's
sufficient.76

In furtherance of his explanation to prove that the decision
to challenge Ms. Brown was race-neutral, Mr. Vincent offered
the fact that he had refrained from excluding two Hispanic
members of the jury. 77 The district court subsequently accepted
the reasons offered by the prosecutor as race-neutral and denied
any relief to the defendant.78 In the instant case, the issue rests
heavily on the interpretation of the second prong of raceneutrality and the third prong of pretextual analysis made by the
trial court.

75 Id.
76

Id. at *4-5.

77

Id. at *5.

78

Id.
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B. STEP Two: RACE-NEUTRAL UNDER BATSON TODAY?
The "race-neutral" issue coupled with the issue of
pretextuality has been the focal point of many debates since the
Batson decision. 79 In Ramirez-Soberanes, Ms. Brown was struck
from the jury because she worked at McDonald's, which would
potentially render her sympathetic towards minorities. 80
Following Batson there were a number of cases in which
jurors were challenged for reasons analogous to the reasons set
forth in Ramirez-Soberanes 81 In United States v. Sneed,82 a
juror was challenged because of her profession and the place in
which she lived, and the challenge was upheld by the court.83 In
a slightly more narrow decision, United States v. Bishop, 84 the
Ninth Circuit followed United States Supreme Court precedent by
barring the prosecutor from making a challenge based on a mere
assumption.85 The Ramirez-Soberanes case differs from Bishop
in that the prosecutor's explanation in the instant case was not an
assumption, rather, as the prosecution explained, he was speaking
through experience. 86 Furthermore, the challenge was made to
eliminate a juror who could possibly carry sympathies toward
minorities and to eliminate the possibility of any prejudice on the
petit jury, rather than on mere speculation. 87 "Numerous factors
Compare Mahony, supra note 25, at 168-70, and Andrew G. Gordon,
Beyond Batson v. Kentucky: A Proposed Ethical Rule Prohibiting Racial
Discriminationin Jury Selection, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 685, 693-706 (1993),
with Christopher E. Smith and Roxanne Ochoa, The Peremptory Challenge in
the Eyes of the Trial Judge, JUDICATURE, 185-88 (1996).
80 Ramirez-Soberanes, No. 99-4097, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6666, at *4.
81 See United States v. Alvarado, 951 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1991); See also
United States v. Lane, 866 F.2d 103 (4th Cir. 1989) (these cases dealt with the
issue of making peremptory challenges based on employment and prejudice).
79

Sneed, 34 F.3d at 1570.
83 Id. at 1580 (the prospective juror was a Chinese-American woman who
"worked in the counseling field and lived in Bolder, Colorado, commonly
known as a liberal community) Id. at 1579.
84 959 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1992).
82

85

Id. at 825.

86 Ramirez-Soberanes, No. 99-4097, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6666, at *4.
87

Id.
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may influence the decision of a prosecutor and defense counsel,
including current and past employment, general appearance and
demeanor, previous jury service, and the absence or presence of
apparentprejudice." 88 In 1991, the Alvarado case encountered
the issues of employment and sympathy. 89 Two jurors were
challenged and ultimately struck from the jury. 90 The first juror
struck was a minority woman who was challenged because she
had children that were the same age as the defendant and the
prosecution felt this would make her sympathetic towards the
defendant. 9' The second juror was challenged based on the
woman's employment as a social worker. 92 The trial court found
that both reasons were race-neutral and the Second Circuit
93
affirmed.
To further analyze this issue we must also consider the
situation where the prosecutor's explanation is not considered
race-neutral, as in United States v. Wilson. 9 In Wilson, the
defendant made a Batson claim that the six challenges against
black jurors violated his constitutional rights. 9 At the Batson
hearing, the district court found the first step of the Batson test to
be satisfied and offered the prosecution an opportunity to offer a
race-neutral explanation. 96 The following is an excerpt from the
race-neutral explanation given:
Q.
Will you admit that because of the large
number of blacks in the Lexa area and because of
Wilson's reputation it was necessary for you to
more closely scrutinize the black panel members
than the white panel members; yes or no?

"89 Lane, 866 F.2d at 106 (emphasis added).
Alvarado, 951 F.2d at 24-26.
90

Id.at24.

9' Id.
92 Id.

93 Id.
at

26.

94884 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1989).
9'Id. at 1122.
96 Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol17/iss3/10
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A.
With regard to the Lexa area, it was the
connection with Mr. Wilson, which was the
problem; not so much the race.
Q.

Well, did you not -

A.
I mean, race is just a - race sets it up like
being a member of a lodge. 97
"[T]he prosecutor must give a 'clear and reasonably
specific' explanation of his 'legitimate reasons' for exercising the
challenges. " 98 "[A] finding of intentional discrimination is a
finding of fact entitled to appropriate deference by a reviewing
court." 99 With these Batson concepts in mind, the court held that
the Government did not present a race-neutral explanation for the
peremptory challenge, rather, the prosecutor clearly indicated a
stereotypical racial reason for striking the potential black juror.' 00
In spite of the fact that a conclusion based on the
foregoing reasons could be made in determining whether a raceneutral reason was given in Ramirez-Soberanes, the 1995 case of
Purkett v. Elem solidifies the analysis of how a court should
interpret the second prong of Batson.'0 1
C. THE IMPACT OF PURKETT v. ELEM ON STEP Two
The Purkett Court stated that "[t]he second prong of this
process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or
even plausible." 102 This is best evidenced in the reasoning given
by the prosecution in the Purkett case for challenging two black
males. His explanation follows:
97

Id. at 1123.

U.S. at 98, n.20 (quoting Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981)).
99 Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, n.21 (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470
98 Batson, 476

U.S. 564, 573 (1985)).
'0o
Wilson, 884 F.2d at 1124-25.
'0'Purkett, 514 U.S. at 766-68.
'02Id. at 768.
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I struck [juror] number twenty-two because of his
long hair. He had long curly hair. He had the
longest hair of anybody on the panel by far. He
appeared to me to not be a good juror for that fact,
the fact that he had long hair hanging down
shoulder length, curly, unkempt hair. Also, he
had a mustache and goatee type beard. And juror
number twenty-four also had a mustache and
goatee type beard. Those are the only two people
on the jury ...with facial hair . . .And I don't
like the way they looked, with the way the hair is
cut, both of them. And the mustaches and the
beards look suspicious to me. 103
The Purkett Court went on to affirm the Missouri Court of
Appeals' finding that the reasoning was a "legitimate hunch,"
which did not "raise the necessary inference of racial
discrimination." 104
Purkett allows an explanation for a
peremptory challenge that is merely facially valid, even if "silly
or superstitious," which places an extremely heavy burden on the
defendant who is making the Batson claim. 10 5 The Supreme
Court explains that it is a mistake to merge the second and third
prongs of Batson and that the trial judge need not terminate the
inquiry simply because of the reason offered in the second
06
prong. 1
This decision obviously erupted much emotion in critics,
beginning with the dissent by Justice Stevens and Justice
Breyer.1 ° 7 "Today, without argument, the Court replaces the
Batson standard with the surprising announcement that any
neutral explanation, no matter how implausible or fantastic, even
if it is silly or superstitious, is sufficient to rebut a prima facie
"oId. at 766.
Id. at 766 (quoting State v. Elem, 747 S.W.2d 772, 775 (Mo. App.
1988)).
'05 Id. at 768.
106 Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768.
107 Id. at 770-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104
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case of discrimination." 10 8 The decision in Purkett frustrated
many, and in the eyes of those who oppose peremptory
challenges, the Supreme Court gave attorneys the right to make
irrational decisions
with
"implausible
and ridiculous
09
explanations." 1 Today, in the wake of Purkett, Mr. RamirezSoberanes is left with the burden of proving the prosecutor's state
of mind, which is a near impossibility without a clear admission
of discrimination, as was the case in Wilson." 0
IV. CONCLUSION

The peremptory challenge has long been a part of the legal
community and at this time in history does not seem to be an
element that will soon disappear. The cases that led up to Batson
and those that would follow helped develop the peremptory
challenge into the tool that it is today. The peremptory challenge
jurisprudence has unfolded with the attempted goal of eliminating
racial discrimination; there are serious doubts as to whether this
can be done. However, whether one agrees or disagrees, the
Supreme Court is clear as to its opinion on this issue. From the
overwhelming case law that followed these decisions, it is fair to
conclude that the explanation given in Ramirez-Soberances would
be considered race-neutral.
With the most recent and
controversial decision, Purkett v. Elem, it is no surprise that the
evolution of the peremptory challenge is far from over.

lo
109

Id. at 775.
See Hochberg, supra note 26, at 12 (discussing the Supreme Court

decision of Purkett v. Elem).
110

See Mahony, supra note 25, at 169.
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